The Decider: George W. Bush and the Presidency

[Originally written on 01 October 2007]

The presidency is more than a man (or, to be politically correct, a woman); it is an institution. This argument is commonly made in attempting to demonstrate transcendent nature of the office. The office is designed to shape its occupant, but history has proven the opposite to be equally true. The personality of a president shapes his decision-making style, and by extension, the nation. In times of calamity, it is desirable to have in place a strong, capable leader. The Gilded Age presidents were generally regarded as weak because the public demanded weak personalities, seeing such men as less likely to overstep the bounds of their power. The 1896 election of William McKinley over the far more dominant personality of William Jennings Bryan exemplifies the desire that existed for the time for an almost blasé attitude toward governing. In this sense, it is evident that the public appetite for presidential assertiveness or indifference in any particular election year is a preeminent factor in determining who they will select. In modern times, voters have attempted to balance out these two extremes. Successful cases of this strategy would likely include Bill Clinton or Dwight Eisenhower, men who presided over relatively prosperous times and whose greatest contribution arguably was to let well enough alone. Conversely, Jimmy Carter was a micro-manager at heart, and the sheer magnitude of the duties and responsibilities of the presidency, as well as the unique challenges of his time, overwhelmed him. Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, both dominant personalities, were consumed by a seemingly insatiable desire for power, although this desire certainly manifested in different ways. I provide this background because it is essential to grasp just how presidential personality impacts presidential decision-making. In some cases, this inextricable link has proven advantageous; in others, it has led to disaster.

George W. Bush is almost universally-regarded as a passive executive, preferring to establish a broad vision for public policy and delegate the responsibility for executing that policy to trusted aides and officials. To him, “the vision thing” is most important. This stands in stark contrast to the management style of his predecessor, a policy wonk and workaholic who often found it difficult to avoid injecting himself into the execution of even the minutest policy objectives. This is not to say that President Clinton did not have vision, but it was often difficult to ascertain where that vision was heading; his aggressive efforts on the budget and health care reform in his first two years office nearly imploded his presidency, exemplifying the dangers of trying to do too much too fast. Later into his term, Clinton shifted his style but, as I noted earlier, the underlying personality traits driving it were still very much evident. President Bush, on the other hand, has maintained a fairly consistent governing style not only during his six and a half years in the White House, but also during his six-year tenure as Governor of the State of Texas and in his business ventures. This hands-off approach leads some to conclude that the President is an intellectually lazy dolt who knows little about the issues upon which he must decide; others assert that his is the most effective governing style because it avoids the disastrous scatter-brained approach to governing that nearly imploded Clinton’s presidency and surely rendered Jimmy Carter a below average-to-poor Chief Executives. The latter presidents typically classified everything under the sun as a “top priority”; Bush rarely utters those words when referring to policy. He truly is a “big picture” guy.

Bush is the first occupant of the Oval Office to hold an MBA, and the operations of his presidential administration likely reflect the lessons of business school. Thomas Lifson articulates in his article, “GWB: HBS MBA,” the management style glorified in business school. This style emphasizes the importance of accepting that most business (and executive) decisions are made under a varied level of uncertainty. This reality often does not allow for the luxury of detailed analysis or seasoned counsel by experts. The second element of this style provides that it is essential not too extend oneself too thin (i.e. Clinton in 1993-94; Carter throughout his entire presidency). Having too many goals can be dangerous; it is better to articulate a broad vision and let the other pieces fall into place, relying on capable (ideally) managers to do the grunt work. The President’s administration, unlike that of his two immediate predecessors (one of whom is his father), is run almost corporately. It is difficult to imagine this White House operating efficiently without an array of flow charts clearly delineating the chain-of-command. Clinton, on the other hand, was notorious for his informal governing style and casual relationship with his senior staff. George H.W. Bush struck a moderate balance between the styles of his two successors. The organization of his administration reflects George W. Bush’s affection for delegating; he is almost seemingly disinterested in how his vision is implemented. In this sense, the junior Bush is much like Ronald Reagan, who once directed his Secretary of State to reduce a one-hundred page briefing memorandum on American foreign policy to one-page; this is likely a directive that Bush would embrace. As Lifson effectively argues, it would be fallacious to immediately regard this style as indicative of some sort of intellectual inferiority. However, it can have its risks; just as Carter became overwhelmed with the realization that he could not directly handle every aspect of managing the federal government, Bush at times likely becomes overwhelmed with the realization that leading a nation requires a little more deliberation and attention to detail than he would prefer.

The junior Bush is, at least as far as governing style is concerned, vastly different from the senior. George H.W. Bush was intimately familiar with the intricacies of public policy, often becoming so overwhelmed by the details that he was incapable of making a definitive judgment. The junior Bush, on the other hand, is distrustful of so-called policy experts, and generally makes a decision based upon his “gut instinct.” Trite as it may seem, for better or worse, George W. Bush’s approach to governing is emblematic of cowboy-style management; act quickly and decisively, and once a course is decided upon, proceed full speed ahead with no regrets. The elder Bush was far more pragmatic in his decision-making. Perhaps no policy decision more clearly epitomizes this difference than in how the two Bushes handled Iraq. The elder Bush chose not to proceed into Baghdad and topple Saddam Hussein because he feared the prospect of a long-term American commitment in the heart of the Middle East; in essence, he feared finding himself and the nation in the very same predicament we now find ourselves in. Toppling Saddam Hussein, the elder Bush decided, was not the pragmatic thing to do. The junior Bush, however, chose to do exactly what his father had decided against. Mr. Bush was surely advised of the difficulties such an action would present, but his distrust of policy experts and his faith in his own judgment led him to ignore this advice in favor of a more idealistic vision of the consequences of an Iraqi invasion. The present situation in Iraq demonstrates the inherent dangers in the blasé, big picture, gut instinct governing-style. Our continued presence there in the hopes of saving face or achieving a stable, benevolent democracy reflects another aspect of Mr. Bush’s personality: standing firm once a decision has been made. President Kennedy, following the embarrassing Bay of Pigs debacle, immediately took responsibility for the failure. Mr. Bush, while grudgingly acknowledging some mistakes, is nonetheless committed to maintaining the course he decided upon four years ago. Psychologically, this is a compelling case. Some would cite arrogance; others a desire to save face. Regardless, there is no more poignant example of presidential personality influencing national policy, and indeed, world affairs, than America’s invasion of and continued presence in Iraq.

The advantages of Mr. Bush’s governing style have been overlooked in the face of the difficulties in Iraq and the controversy surrounding his response to Hurricane Katrina. However, several important political and policy objectives have been fulfilled as a direct result of Bush’s abhorrence for detail and affection for delegation. While Mr. Clinton’s health care reform efforts were derailed in large measure because of the complex nature of the detailed proposal he submitted, Mr. Bush was able to secure passage of sweeping modernization and expansion of the Medicare program by articulating broad objectives and letting the legislators and policy wonks fill in the blanks. Similarly, Mr. Bush’s education reform plan, the so-called “No Child Left Behind Act,” would likely not have passed had the White House been insistent upon adhering to every single detail of the President’s proposal. Mr. Bush’s governing style allows for a flexibility that can prove quite advantageous in getting things done. Rigid adherence to detail on the President’s part would have derailed education and Medicare reform; instead, Mr. Bush was able to secure passage of both measures with support from liberal Democrats. Bush is enigmatic in that he is willing, almost eager to compromise on some issues; on others, he is almost completely disinterested in the views of others, charting his own path and paying little attention to low approval ratings or biting political criticism.

Mr. Bush’s personality, in the final analysis, has certainly shaped his presidency. In some respects, the times and the challenges of his term have shaped him, but ultimately the nature of the man has determined his response to them. It is unclear what management style the public prefers, for this seems to change with the times. In some respects, as I have noted, his personality and governing style have served him and the nation, depending on one’s viewpoint, well, for his style allows for flexibility that increases the likelihood for substantive achievement. Had Mr. Clinton, for instance, had a personality and governing style more like Mr. Bush’s, he may have been successful in creating a system of universal health insurance. Conversely, if Mr. Bush were more like Mr. Clinton, he may have had a fuller grasp of the complexities of the various issues he has faced, notably Iraq, and his presidency and the nation may have been better-served. Mr. Bush’s legacy is for the historians to determine, but the pitfalls of his management style and the detriments of his personality to his presidency and the nation are evident. There is a glaring absence of pragmatism, an almost unrivaled presence of arrogance and an often dangerous ignorance of the complexities of the times in which we live on the part of Mr. Bush. His personality and management style have served him well on occasion, but ultimately they contributed directly to his low standing now, and should he earn such a standing permanently, in the pages of history.