Iraq: The Way Forward -- An Analysis of President George W. Bush's September 13, 2007 Address

[Originally written on 01 October 2007]

Few presidents have hinged their legacy upon one issue as George W. Bush has done with the war in Iraq. As the Bush presidency draws to a close, there is no issue that more dominates the American political climate. Every president is quite fond of legacy-shopping: Bill Clinton thought that the enactment of health care reform would propel him into the category of forward-thinking, visionary presidents; Ronald Reagan was determined to reduce the size of government and endow the people greater freedom; Lyndon Johnson sought to create a “Great Society” of economic opportunity and social justice for all. However, the only certainty in planning for a presidential term is that there is no certainty. Clinton failed to secure the legacy of being the president to deliver universal health insurance for all Americans; instead, his political stumbling led to the sweeping Democratic defeat in 1994, forcing him to compromise with an opposition Congress. Reagan’s hopes for a smaller federal government were shattered with the intensification of the cold war. Johnson’s Great Society legacy has been overshadowed by the Vietnam quagmire. Similarly, George W. Bush was elected to the presidency on a platform emphasizing smaller government and “humility” in the conduct of American foreign affairs. The events of September 11, 2001 dramatically altered the nation and the focus of the man leading it. The war on terrorism, which is now centered upon Iraq, is likely to be the preeminent consideration when historians judge Bush’s performance and assess his legacy.

Since the initial invasion in March 2003, public support for the war and Bush himself have steadily declined, with roughly 65% of the public disapproving of Bush’s job performance and a similarly high percentage of the population disapproving of his handling of the situation in Iraq. The 2006 mid-term elections put both houses of Congress in Democratic hands for the first time since 2006. In January 2007, Bush unveiled his new strategy, a “surge” of 21,500 troops in Baghdad and the surrounding area in order to create the stability needed to achieve political reconciliation. Undeterred by congressional attempts to facilitate a troop withdrawal and continued public disapproval of the war, Bush asked Americans to wait patiently until September, when General David Petraeus would report to the Congress and the nation on the situation in Iraq. This report came on September 11, 2007, followed by a primetime televised address by Mr. Bush on September 13. The overriding theme of Bush’s address is clear: these are consequential times, and the outcome of the situation in Iraq will determine “the direction of [the] country and reveal the character of its people.” He refers to Iraq frequently in the speech as an “ally,” dismissing calls for a “precipitous withdrawal” as uncharacteristic of an honorable nation. A nation of character would not abandon an ally in its time of need, regardless of the difficulty. The language is similar to Lyndon Johnson’s March 31, 1968 statement: “A strong and confident and vigilant America stands ready… to seek an honorable peace… and to defend an honored cause, whatever the price, whatever the burden, whatever the sacrifice, that duty will require.” I note Johnson’s statement not to make the argument that the fundamentals of the two situations are somehow related, but to demonstrate the consistently of presidential rhetoric when soliciting public support for an unpopular war.

Bush attempts to make the case that the situation in Iraq is improving, but acknowledges that the road ahead will be difficult. However, Bush cites the improved security situations in Baghdad and Anbar province to demonstrate the capacity for progress and provide the justification for continued American involvement. Bush acknowledges the failures of the Iraqi central government, and announces a new strategy that will seek to advance political reconciliation locally rather than nationally (bottom-up). In the speech, Mr. Bush announces a modest troop withdrawal, citing the improved security situation in Iraq. The basis for the new American strategy is “return on success”: American troops will return hope as the mission succeeds, security improves, and political reconciliation and progress takes hold.

Rhetorically, Bush, true to his own management style, tries to articulate the “big picture.” Yes, there have been failures, but the situation overall, he argues, is improving. Further, he attempts to dispel the notion that the Iraq conflict is irrelevant to the war on terror, predicting disaster if Americans leave too soon. A defeat in Iraq and the creation of a new terrorist safe haven would create a more dangerous world, “and as we saw on September the 11th, 2001, those dangers can reach our cities and kill our people.” By drawing a link between 9/11 and the Iraq conflict, President Bush is clearly attempting to move the debate back to the central issue of our time: terrorism. The obvious implication Mr. Bush is making is that if Americans withdrawal too soon and allow Iraq to collapse and fall to terrorist forces, then another attack on America would be a real possibility. Although he does not say so in this address, this implication is clearly along the same lines as Bush’s frequent assertion that we must fight the terrorists “over there” so we do not have to battle them “in the streets of America.” In closing, Bush invokes the memory of Brandon Stout, arguing that his sacrifice and the sacrifice of those who have fought and those who have died in Iraq demand a successful resolution to the Iraq conflict. “Freedom is not free,” Stout’s parents write in a letter to the President urging him to ensure that the mission is completed. While a logic professor may cite this as a fallacy of composition (do the Stout’s represent the majority of families?), this is an irrefutably effective rhetorical strategy. Too many have died for us to leave now, Bush argues.

Rhetorically, the speech is actually quite effective, but it may be too late. It appeared to have little to no effect on public support for the war and did nothing to stymie congressional efforts to force Bush to bring an end to the war. It is evident that Bush intends to continue American involvement in the conflict until noon on January 20, 2009, at which point it will become someone else’s problem. The highly divisive nature of this debate and Bush’s low credibility with Congress and the general public rendered what actually was a substantive and rhetorically strong speech as merely “more of the same.” Very few believe much of what Bush says anymore. Only pockets of support exist for his strategy. Democrats quickly pounced on the President’s address, dismissing it as a new way to say the same old thing, and were clearly irked at Bush’s announcement of a modest troop withdrawal. Now, when Democrats call for a withdrawal of troops, the White House can say that Bush is proceeding in that direction and accuse Democrats of never being satisfied regardless of what the president does. Some Democrats specifically accused Bush of being more interested in saving face to shore up his own legacy than in the welfare of American troops and American credibility. Some prominent Democrats issued their reactions before Mr. Bush even delivered his remarks, and Senator John Edwards bought air-time to address the nation immediately after Bush’s speech. Mr. Edwards, of course, condemned everything Mr. Bush said.

In contrast, GOP presidential candidates largely applauded the President’s address. It is likely that some are banking on the modest troop withdrawal Bush announced offering them political cover. Neo-conservatives, of course, offered nothing but praise for Bush’s speech. Having supported the war from the beginning, they would be the last to ever turn against it. A National Review editorial notes that Mr. Bush can never expect to win over the support of those who ardently oppose the war (Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, far-left elements of the Democratic Party), but that if things improve in Iraq he could regain the backing of independents and moderates who hope for American success. Democrats, the neo-cons argue, are selfishly hoping that the new strategy does not succeed because this would be politically advantageous for Mr. Bush, and this is something they cannot accept. The “mainstream media” met Bush’s address with skepticism, with some reducing Mr. Bush’s “new way forward” to an old way nowhere.

The three most difficult groups to assess are the Iraqis, the Iranian government and the American public. Mr. Bush directly addresses the Iraqis in his address, promising that America would stand with them as they work to forge a new nation capable of governing itself and warding off dangerous forces. Whether or not the Iraqis want a continued American presence is a difficult question to answer, for though poll after poll demonstrates an increasingly unfavorable, even scornful opinion of the United States among Iraqi citizens, additional polls also make clear that they are torn over whether or not America should leave. I would render this dichotomy as akin to a disdain that is widespread in America for taxes and law enforcement—Americans abhor taxes and at times detest the over-reaching arm of law enforcement, but still demand the benefits of an active, progressive government and the safety that sophisticated law enforcement provides. Iraqis are reluctant, it appears, for an American withdrawal because they fear who will take America’s place.

Mr. Bush directly addresses the Iranian (and Syrian) governments, warning them that their efforts to undermine the Iraqi government and sabotage American efforts to improve security must stop. The reaction of the Iranian government is difficult to ascertain because of the underlying complexities that exist in this issue. On one hand, they have been labeled by the United States, specifically Mr. Bush, as part of the “axis of evil,” and likely view themselves as the next logical target in the U.S. global campaign against terrorism. Thus, it would be in their interest for the United States to remain bogged down in Iraq (for if America is fighting there then Iran is safe), or, paradoxically, a precipitous American withdrawal could permit Iran to assert its dominance in the region by moving into Iraq and assuming power on a de facto basis. The complexities in analyzing this perhaps indicates that the war on terrorism is not as simple to conduct as some, including President Bush, would like.

Finally, the reaction of the American public is the most difficult to assess. To be trite, it could be said that the United States is trapped between “Iraq” and a hard place. While the national consensus is clearly that the war was a mistake and it has been conducted poorly, the nation is divided on the issue of whether to withdrawal or continue forward. This is akin to the dichotomy Iraqis face about disliking America but desiring the protection it offers. Iraqis fear who may step in America’s place if the United States withdrawals; Americans share this concern. Our two peoples are, in this sense, united. As Barack Obama frequently observes, there are no good options with regard to Iraq: “there are bad options and worse options.”

It is clear that Mr. Bush is no longer an effective spokesman for this war, nor was he ever an effective manager of it. This is fundamentally the reason for the public’s dissatisfaction with the war. It is true that the American public historically is reticent to embrace war, but history demonstrates that this is not always the case. Franklin Roosevelt enjoyed high popularity as he conducted World War II, largely because he projected the image of an engaged, capable manager of that effort. Even Lyndon Johnson’s approval ratings never fell below 43% in spite of the widespread public divisions over the Vietnam War. Public approval or disapproval of a war depends, more than anything else, on the nature of the man leading it. It is highly likely that America faces a long and difficult involvement in Iraq, and such a course could be justified to the nation by a fresh face—a new president, regardless of party, capable of setting a new course for the war and the nation. Mr. Bush’s legacy, in the final analysis, may not be of his making, for it is increasingly clear that the outcome of the situation in Iraq will hinge upon the actions of whoever sits in the Oval Office after him.